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ABSTRACT 
 
The 2007/8 financial crisis exposed and exacerbated the debt pathologies of the 
‘West’. The paper examines whether the new global debt relations that have been 
generated by this crisis have transformed global power politics, changing the way in 
which the ‘global South’ and the ‘global North’ interrelate and interact. To do so the 
paper juxtaposes the G20 advanced and emerging economies and examines a number 
of key indicators related to debt, indebtedness and financial leverage. This research 
leads to two main findings: (i) the crisis has indeed given rise to new global debt 
relations. Any reforms, therefore, in the post-crisis global political economy will take 
place in an environment that favours the emerging powers (ii) The US maintains its 
capacity to control the parameters of this new global debt politics and economics, but 
cannot impose a solution to the existing ‘global/hegemonic imbalances’ on the 
emerging powers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*A shorter version of this paper is forthcoming in: Third World Quarterly, 34:2, 2013. 
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The evolving global economic crisis has forcefully shaken the foundations and 
parameters of the existing ‘international order’. Whether the present crisis episode is a 
manifestation of a broader hegemonic transition process or of a milder re-balancing 
act with no hegemonic implications, remains to be seen. Put differently, only time will 
tell whether the current crisis will function as a ‘pressure valve release’ for the benefit 
of the existing order or as a catalyst for a different world order. In any case, the 
impact of the crisis on the existing world order is inexorably related to the way in 
which the social agents and the social collectivities involved in these social 
fermentations will respond to and handle this crisis and the challenges, opportunities 
and threats generated by it. Thus, we do not know the end of the story not because we 
do not have access to a script already written (divinely or by structural imperatives) 
but because it is impossible to predetermine the behavior and actions of the actors 
involved (much more so because they themselves seem not to know what to do). 
Unlike theatre, here, the actors write the script and have the final word on how the act 
will end (albeit not in conditions of their own choosing)!           
 
 
Hence, the International Relations analysts are back to the drawing board to examine 
the actual and potential geopolitical, geoeconomic and geo-cultural implications of 
the current economic crisis and its repercussions. Contributing to this aim, this article 
aspires to assess the way in which debt operates as an instrument of power 
(instrumental and structural) in the context of hegemonic rivalry in the current 
historical juncture. The paper attempts to assess the impact of the current ‘global 
relations of debt’ on the US hegemony and through it to the current global hegemonic 
order that is based on the primacy of the West. In this attempt, our main concern is 
not with debt as an economic phenomenon that can be modeled and analysed in 
separation to (international) socio-political relations and power, but with debt as a 
socio-political relation and power
1
. Along these lines our main interest is to examine 
the way in which debt impacts on current great power politics. Our key question is 
whether the current global relations of debt have transformed the way in which great 
power politics materialise in the global political economy. 
 
 
 
The View Ex Ante: Reversed Keynesianism and Financial Engineering         
 
 
In a paradoxical way, the global economic crisis that started with the collapse of the 
subprime-market in the US, in 2007, gave an answer to the pre-crisis ‘million-dollar 
question’: ‘who owns the debt’.  Before the break out of the crisis, the new ‘originate 
and distribute’ banking model, assisted by SPVs, financial innovation and soft-touch 
regulation seemed to have achieved the impossible! It had generated so many 
‘security layers’ (see ‘securitised’) through which risk was spread so widely and 
thinly that in reality it had ‘vanished’.  Magic(al) indeed (akin to Zenon’s paradox on 
motion)! Furthermore, the countries where this pure magic ruled were the countries 
that demonstrated strong and sustained economic growth rates. The success of this 
economic model was undeniable and all other capitalist models faced a huge 
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challenge: to imitate-converge with this model or be trapped in sluggish growth rates, 
high unemployment, and high deficits.  
 
 
Of course, the rising level of private, especially household, debt in these economies 
was a matter of concern. But the argument went that to grasp this phenomenon one 
should come to terms with a ‘new political economy of credit’; i.e. the different way 
in which contemporary economies functioned. A number of arguments were raised in 
this regard. Excessive ‘plastic money’ may indeed be a liability and a threat to the 
economic system. Yet, what was happening in these economies was that ‘plastic 
money’ was translated in real growth rates. Put differently, plastic money increased 
consumption that in turn generated production and growth rates that led to increased 
employment, which, with new ‘real money’, boosted production and the real 
economy. Thus, what started as ‘virtual and plastic’ ended up as ‘real and productive’. 
Plastic money was translated into new employment, production and growth. This, of 
course, made perfect Keynesian sense too. Yet, this time the role of the ‘booster’ was 
not played by the state but by the market, which of course (the argument goes) is 
much better positioned to play such a role (gather credit information, assess risk etc.). 
Consequently, it was not ‘public’ but ‘private’ debt that was accumulated for the 
purposes of the ‘Keynesian operation.’ But, again, considering the troubling historical 
record of state in (mal)managing public debt, this might be good news and represent a 
safer, lower risk mutation of the traditional centralised Keynesian model. Thus, the 
new political economy of credit was nothing more than a new ‘reversed Keynesian’ 
model; a ‘new Keynesianism’ for a globalised neoliberal world2.     
 
 
Another issue of concern in this new economic environment was the low and 
decreasing household saving rates, and the overall degree of household leverage (a 
by-product of the accumulated private debt in the ‘reversed Keynesianism’). The 
counterargument with regard to saving rates was the following. The data on low 
household saving rates did not reflect accurately the saving position of households, 
because they did not include the households’ ‘largest investment in the future’, i.e. 
property in the form of mortgage—a solid asset with historically rising value. For 
instance, in the US, mortgages corresponded approximately to 70% of private debt 
over the last decade
3
. If this asset was taken into consideration in the calculation of 
saving rates, then the Anglo-Saxon economies and households were not different in 
comparison to those in other economies in Europe and beyond. The same logic 
applied for the Anglo-Saxon households’ overall leverage. Their borrowing had 
increased significantly since 1990. In the US, for instance, household debt rose by 
more than half, reaching 98% of GDP in 2008, whereas in the UK it was doubled 
from 51% in 1990 to 103% of GDP in 2008
4
. Yet, taking into consideration that most 
of this borrowing represented home mortgages, as well as the fact that house prices 
kept rising throughout the pre-crisis period, then household leverage, accounted in 
term of the the ratio of household debt to household assets, appeared low and stable—
no cause for alarm for public authorities. Yet, if household leverage was counted in 
terms not of assets but of disposable income, then the degree of households leverage 
should have alerted public authorities well before the 2007 subprime market collapse
5
.     
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This collapse gave an answer to the question  of ‘who owns the debt’ of the reversed 
Keynesian period, or more accurately, who would pay for it.  When the magic 
disappeared (as magic does) and the ‘security layers’ started to fall apart like playing 
cards, public authorities stepped in. The Lehman Brothers episode was the ‘crossing-
the-Rubicon’ point in this regard. In a spectacular move, the collapsing Western 
financial system was de facto ‘nationalised’ and trillions of virtual dollars that were 
recycled through its complicated infrastructure were turned into public liabilities. 
From that point onwards, the Western economic system has seemed like a gigantic 
half-empty balloon, which, despite the mounting levels of air (i.e. money) thrown into 
it, does not seem able to recover. The rest of the world watched the developments in 
the West with shock and awe.  
 
 
  
Distinctive elements of the current debt crisis  
 
 
Crises such as the current one are not unknown or unprecedented in world economic 
history. Rather the opposite. The current crisis seems to be just one more episode in 
the way in which the modern capitalist system has evolved, at least since the 
beginning of the 17
th
 century and the infamous tulip-crisis in Holland
6
. Yet, despite 
the striking similarities among all past capitalist crises, these crises differ in their 
geopolitical and geoeconomic implications. To assess the latter, one needs not only to 
be aware of the structural/systemic causes of these recurrent crisis episodes, but also 
of what is distinctive about each crisis and how these distinctive elements matter and 
operate in each unique histrorical juncture. Beyond the uniqueness of the broader 
historical context, what Barry Gills refers to as the ‘triple conjuncture’ –
financial/capitalist crisis, hegemonic transition crisis, environmental crisis
7
 – the 
current crisis is also unique in a number of ways that relate to global debt relations 
and dynamics.  
 
 
The pattern of the global distribution of deficits and surpluses (what is usually 
referred to as ‘global imbalances’) is a key issue here. Although the crisis led to an 
increase in debt levels almost everywhere, the main ‘victims’ in terms of mounting 
debt levels have been the advanced economies. The public debt to GDP ratio in the 
Group of 20 (G20) advanced economies from 64% in 2006 is expected to approach 
110% in 2013. It is projected to maintain this upward route at least until 2015. The 
respective figure for the emerging G20 economies in 2009 stood at 38% (having 
fallen from its post-Asian crisis historical high of 71%)
8
. As Reinhart and Rogoff 
note, from the 20
th
 century onwards, the only time in history in which the advanced 
economies registered higher public debt levels was in the mid-1940s, when they were 
absorbing the impact of World War II
9
. Further, if we add household and corporate 
debt to public debt, the debt levels of the advanced economies is even higher in 
historical terms, approaching on average the 315% of their GDP (see below)
10
. And 
these historically high debt levels are combined with interest rates that are at a 200 
year low
11
! In this context, the ever-deepening sovereign debt crisis in Europe 
threatens the very existence of the Euro and the Eurozone, if not the European project 
as a whole. 
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The other side of this rising indebtedness of the advanced economies is the direction 
of the current account imbalances. In the current financial crisis, net savings/surpluses 
are not moving from ‘advanced’ to ‘emerging’ economies (as under the ‘gold 
standard’ and in the 1990s), or from ‘advanced’ to ‘advanced’ economies (as in the 
financial crises of the 1980s), or from ‘emerging’ to ‘emerging’ economies (as in the 
1970s). For the first time in modern economic history, surpluses are moving from 
‘emerging’ to ‘advanced’ economies, i.e. the ‘periphery’ bails out the ‘centre’12. In 
this sense, any reforms in the world economy triggered by the crisis, take place in a 
context of global current account imbalances that favour the emerging economies. 
Furthermore, these imbalances are at a historical high as a percentage of world GDP 
(close to 6% at the end of the 2000s), a fact that strengthens further the position of 
emerging economies in the current conjuncture
13
.  The pattern of distribution of 
surpluses and deficits comes to strengthen this view. The degree of concentration of 
deficits in a single country, the US, is historically unprecedented. In 2008, the US 
current account deficit accounted for the 75% of world current account deficits or put 
differently, the US absorbed approximately 75% of world net savings. At the same 
time, the high number of countries with large current account surpluses (above 9% of 
GDP) is also striking in historical terms. In 1985 only three countries accounted for 
50% of world surpluses, and they were all advanced (Japan, Germany and the 
Netherlands), whereas in 2005 there were five including representatives from the 
BRICs and oil-producing countries (Japan, China, Germany, Saudi Arabia and 
Russia)
14
.  
 
 
Another element that clearly differentiates the current crisis from past ones is the level 
of financial integration in the world economy. The contemporary global economy is 
characterised both by an unprecedented level of capital market integration, an 
unprecedented level of financialisation, and an unprecedented penetration of 
finacialisation techniques in peoples’ everyday lives. These phenomena have not only 
created a crisis-prone international economic system, but have also penetrated and 
destabilised national and international commodity and food markets, endangering the 
livelihood of real people around the world
15
. Critical to all these processes has been 
the generation of debt (private, corporate, financial sector, or government). Thus, for 
instance, a technology such as securitisation that was originally developed to reduce 
risk and benefit people, producers, and the real economy, was transformed into a 
speculation device, with a great capacity to generate downward, ‘globally 
synchronised’ economic spirals16. The composition of generated debt in the current 
episode diverts from past episodes too. In the current crisis, the leverage of the non-
financial corporate sector either did not increase significantly or in some cases 
decreased. The amount of household debt rose to levels never seen in the past, 
exemplifying the deep integration of individuals and households in the 
financialisation structures of global capital. Yet, the sharpest increase in debt was 
registered by financial corporations (followed by households)
17
. The cases of Iceland 
and Ireland are exceptional but indicative. In Iceland, the financial sector debt reached 
580% of the country’s GDP in 2008, pushing the total debt to GDP ratio to the 
astronomical 1.189%.  The respective financial sector debt in Ireland, in 2008, was 
421% of the country’s GDP, whereas the total debt to GDP ratio in the country the 
same year was 700%
18
.  
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The West under the Debt Microscope: Total Debt and Debt Thresholds  
 
 
Most of the attention in the current crisis has been paid to the level of the public debt 
and to a lesser extent to the debt of the financial sector. Indeed, the figure that (at least 
traditionally) really matters for most multilateral economic institutions is that of the 
level of public debt
19
. Yet, focusing on the latter and without accounting for private 
debt, one lacks an accurate picture not only of how leveraged an economy is (and thus 
how fragile its economic situation is and how difficult the deleveraging phase will 
be), but also of the real degree of indebtedness of an economy and its people. 
Especially so, that, as we mentioned above, one of the distinctive characteristics of the 
current crisis episode is the high levels of household indebtedness. Therefore, in 
comparison to ‘public debt’, a more appropriate figure to capture real levels of 
national indebtedness is the ‘total debt’ that consists of both the public and private 
debt (private debt includes households, the corporate non-financial sector and the 
financial sector). 
 
In the beginning of 2011, the ranking of advanced G20 economies in terms of total 
debt to GDP ratio was the following: Japan (512%), the UK (507%), (363%), France 
(346%), South Korea (314%), Italy (314%) and the US (279%), Germany (278%), 
Australia (277%) and Canada (276%), while the advanced economy average was 
339%. The contrast with the BRIC’s total debt is striking. In 2008, China’s total debt 
to GDP stood in 2008 at 159%, Brazil’s at 142%, India’s at 129% and Russia’s at 
71%
20
.  Yet, it has to be noted that the debt and leverage capacity of emerging and 
advanced economies is different
21
.  
 
Furthermore, the level of each of the different debt types of which total debt consists 
exercises an independent effect on economic performance and overall debt 
sustainability. The fact that, Greece’s total debt to GDP ratio in 2011 was just 267% is 
indicative of this (but also of how misplaced a simplified moral discourse on nations’ 
indebtedness can be). Thus, different advanced economies are implicated in different 
debt equations and face different debt problems. The key issue here is above what 
limit debt ceases to be a force for economic development and becomes a drag on 
growth, for each of the different debt types mentioned above (household, corporate 
sector, financial sector, government). In terms of advanced economies’ public debt, 
Reinhart and Rogoff
22
 have suggested that such a ‘drag threshold’ is around 90%, 
Cecchetti et al
23
 have suggested 85%, Caner et al.
24
 put it closer to 77%, and 
Elmeskov and Sutherland
25
 at 70%. The Stability and Growth Pact of the European 
Union requires its member to keep their public debt below 60% and the OECD
26
 
recommends that advanced economies should aim for 50%
27
. The literature is less 
clear with regard to ‘drag thresholds’ for the private debt. The recent scoreboard 
adopted by the European Union for monitoring macroeconomic imbalances put the 
threshold for private debt (corporate, households) at 160% of GDP. Cecchetti et al 
suggest 90% of GDP for corporate debt, and 85% for households. Regardless of the 
exact numbers, most analysts agree that the economies should aim much lower than 
the thresholds levels, so as to be ready to face adverse economic conditions and crises 
(i.e. the rainy days)
28
. Table 1 demonstrates the diversity of debt problems within the 
group of advanced G20 economies. An in-depth analysis of this diversity is beyond 
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our purposes here. Yet it is indicative that all G20 advanced economies have crossed 
at least one debt threshold, whilst the UK, Japan and France are above the maximum 
threshold in three out of four categories.   
 
 
Table 1. Varieties of Debt and Thresholds of Debt Sustainability: the Case of 
Advanced G20 Economies (Q2, 2011) 
 
 
Public Debt 
Threshold Range*: 
60 - 90% of GDP 
Household Debt 
Threshold Range*: 
80 - 85% of GDP 
Corporate Debt 
Threshold Range*:  
80 - 90% of GDP 
Financial Sector 
Debt 
Threshold^: 82% 
Japan  226 Australia 105 Spain 134 UK 219 
Italy  111 UK 98 France 111 Japan 120 
France  90 Canada 91 UK 109 France 97 
Germany  83 USA 87 S. Korea 107 S. Korea 93 
UK 81 Spain 82 Japan  99 Australia 91 
USA 80 S. Korea 81 Italy 82 Germany 87 
Spain 71 Japan 67 USA 72 Italy 76 
Canada  69 Germany  60 Australia 59 Spain  76 
S. Korea 33 France 48 Canada 53 Canada 63 
Australia 21 Italy 45 Germany  49 USA 40 
 Note: Cells in blue demonstrate value above the maximum threshold, whereas grey cells demonstrate value above 
the minimum threshold, as suggested in the literature. The table is based on data presented in Roxburg et al, 2012 
(citing ‘Haver Analytics, national central banks, McKinsey Global Institute). *Threshold range is based on 
respective literature (see above in this article). ^Average of advanced G20 economies, excluding the UK. 
 
 
 
The last issue we should address here has to do with the potential duration of the crisis 
and its negative repercussions on the advanced economies. Based on the analysis of 
past debt crises, Reinhart and Rogoff estimate that debt reduction and deleveraging 
takes on average about seven years. Consequently, they suggest that ‘the ten years 
from 2008 to 2017 will be aptly described as a decade of debt’29. A similar conclusion 
is reached also by Roxburgh et al
30
. Analysing 32 past debt/deleveraging episodes 
they found that the most common policy reaction to these crises was austerity policies 
and that the deleveraging process lasted on average six to seven years, growth was 
sluggish and/or negative for a period of two to five years, and on average the debt to 
GDP ratio declined by around 25%
31
.  
 
 
Yet, the distinctive elements of the current debt crisis may prolong and complicate the 
debt reduction and deleveraging process. Most past deleveraging episodes were 
significantly supported by an increase in net exports that helped boosting growth rates 
in deficit economies
32
. Yet, currently it is highly unlikely that all deficit and highly-
leveraged states can increase their exports simultaneously. If they try to do so, then a 
serious negative impact on international development, poverty, and the environment is 
almost certain, along with increasing trade frictions between export-oriented emerging 
powers and advanced economies
33
.  
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Another significant factor that distinguishes the current crisis from past ones is the 
narrow state ‘policy margin’ owing to the size of public debt. Partly as a result of the 
aforementioned contraction in GDP and partly due to states’ effort to mitigate the 
negative impact of the crisis on the population, public debt is expected to rise for 
several years after the break out of a financial crisis. In past crises, this rise was on 
average 75% of the GDP
34
 though pre-crisis public debt levels were much lower in 
comparison to the current crisis and thus the after-crisis public debt explosion was 
easier to handle. This time the crisis broke-out at a time when the levels of public debt 
in advanced economies were already excessively high. This means that the state’s 
capacity to mitigate the social and economic impact of the crisis is much more 
constrained, and thus, the impact of the crisis on the social fabric may be 
uncontrollable
35
.  
 
 
Thus, policy responses in the current episode take place in a rather uncharted 
environment
36
. Furthermore, the size of the sovereign debt market and the billions that 
advanced economies request from private capital markets each quarter to refinance 
their debt along with the sovereign default overtones of the current crisis especially in 
Europe have produced an explosive mix that act as a destabilising multiplier for the 
global economy and the societies involved. We thus see the transformation of an 
accident-prone to an accident-producing global economic system. Even if the worst is 
avoided (e.g. collapse of the Eurozone, uncontrollable social unrest, disintegration of 
the international trade regime, competitive devaluations etc.), the need to reduce 
public debt and return to sustainable public finance will force Western states to low 
growth rates in years to come.  
 
 
Last but not least, demographics should also be mentioned as an important negative 
contingent factor in the process of debt reduction and deleveraging in the West. The 
population ageing that is observed in many advanced economies constitutes a 
challenge for public finance for it increases public expenditures and reduces public 
revenues, producing at the same time serious challenges for national pension systems. 
Thus, it makes debt reduction more difficult and fiscal sustainability more 
unpredictable
37
.             
 
 
 
Debt as External Dependency  
 
A critical destabilising factor in the global politics of debt is whether public and total 
debt is external or internal
38
. Put differently, whether the government [and the private 
sector] (re)financing their debt through internal or external borrowing
39
. A high 
percentage of external debt in an economy implies more dependency to its external 
debtors (official & private sector) as well as higher vulnerability to adverse changes in 
the external economic environment
40
. This vulnerability increases because most of the 
times external debt is denominated in a foreign currency whose interest rates policy is 
not controlled by the debtor state. External debt was crucial, for instance, in the debt 
crises in Latin America in the 1980s, in East Asia in the 1990s, and in the recent 
Greek debt crisis
41
. 
 
9 
 
 
 
Table 2 demonstrates differences in the composition of total external debt at a 
regional level, a year after the break out of the international financial crisis. We see 
that Latin America has a much more balanced distribution of its external debt in 
comparison to Asia and especially Europe, where the external debt is concentrated in 
the banking sector. 
 
 
Table 2. Composition of External Debt in Selected World Regions 
% of Total External Debt 
 
 General 
Government
1
 
Banks Direct 
Investment 
intercompany 
debt 
Other Sectors
2
 
Latin America 35 16 10 39 
 
Asia 21 45 6 28 
 
Europe 15 54 9 22 
 
1Includes monetary authorities; 2 Includes: nonbank financial corporations, nonfinancial corporations, households, 
not profit institutions serving households 
 
 
Table 3a shows the levels of external debt in the G20 economies. In the beginning of 
2012, the external debt to GDP average for the ten advanced economies is 118% 
(95% excluding the UK), whereas the respective ratio for the ten emerging economies 
is 24.4%
42
. The difference in the external indebtedness between the two groups is 
striking. The percentage of short term external debt of most G20 advanced economies 
is also striking. Short term external debt multiplies the exposure and vulnerability of 
externally indebted economies. In this regard, the UK and Eurozone member-states
43
 
(excluding Italy) appear highly exposed (even after accounting for the UK’s role as a 
global financial centre). Yet, along with the size and length of maturity, the currency 
composition of external debt and the size of net interest payments are also key factors 
for assessing the degree of external dependency/vulnerability (see also below)
44
.  
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Table 3. External Debt, Short Term External Debt and Net International 
Investment Position in the G20 Economies 
 
Table 3a. External Debt Indicators  
 
External debt as % of GDP 
2012, Q1 
 
Short 
Term 
external 
debt 
China^ 5 63.3 
Argentina* 7,6 2.2 
Saudi Arabia? 19 Na 
India* 18.2 4.2 
Brazil* 17.4 1.7 
Mexico 26.4 5.1 
South Africa 29.2 5.4 
Indonesia 26.6 4.4 
Russia 27.7 3.7 
South Korea* 34.9 11.9 
Turkey 43 12.2 
Japan 52.9 39.5 
Canada 68.6 22.3 
Australia 87.8 22.4 
United States 100.2 43.1 
Euro Area* 120.0 Na 
Italy 119.6      38.2 
Germany* 159.4 53.7 
Spain 166.5      60.9 
France* 191.7 72.0 
United Kingdom 418.7 297.9 
  ^ Data for 2010. Source WB, author’s 
calculation. * Data for 2011, Q4 
Table 3b. Net International Investment Position 
  
Net International Investment Position,  
% GDP 
2011 
Japan +54.0 
Germany +35.6 
China
1 +23.7 
Argentina* +12.7 
Saudi Arabia* +107.3 
Russia*
2 +1.0 
Spain -92.5 
Australia* -57.8 
Turkey -47.7 
Indonesia* -40.4 
Brazil -33.3 
Mexico -32.6 
Italy -22.3 
South Africa* -17.5 
United States* -17.0 
France -16.5 
United Kingdom -14.1 
India* -13.0 
Euro Area -12.7 
Canada -12.5 
South Korea -9.0 
*data for 2010. 
1
Excluding Hong Kong 
(which is +287.7). 
2
From +7.9 the previous 
year.   
Source: IMF Statistics (unless otherwise indicated) 
 
 
Yet, the external debt indicator accounts only for the non-equity state liabilities (it 
does not for instance account for FDI or portfolio equity) and therefore it offers us 
only partial information about the external economic position and dependency of a 
country, i.e. whether a country is a net debtor or creditor. To have a complete picture 
of an economy’s balance sheet of external financial assets and liabilities, i.e. to 
examine whether a state is a net global creditor or debtor, we need to examine its net 
international investment position (NIIP). Table 3b focuses on this and presents the 
NIIP for the G20 economies. Interestingly, only six G20 economies had positive net 
foreign asset positions (i.e. they were global creditors) in 2011. These included four 
emerging economies, Saudi Arabia, China, Argentina, and Russia, and two advanced 
economies, Japan and Germany. All other fourteen G20 economies were net global 
debtor. Furthermore, the most unsustainable NIIP (in terms of net foreign liabilities as 
11 
 
a percentage of GDP) were held by Spain (-92.5%) and Australia (-57.8%), followed 
by Turkey (-47.7), Indonesia (-40.4%), Brazil (-33.3%) and Mexico (-32.6%). 
 
 Notable is also the fact that the net international investment position of the US is 
much better in comparison to its position in the world current account balance (i.e. the 
picture emerging from ‘global imbalances’). This concurs with that earlier findings of 
Bracke et al, for 2005, that the US ‘accounts for a much smaller portion of world net 
foreign liabilities (around 37%) than its share of world net current account deficits 
(75%)’45. Yet, the difference between the G20 advanced and emerging economies as 
distinctive groups remains. In 2011, the advanced G20 economies as a group had a 
negative NIIP of $1,6 trillion whereas the emerging G20 economies as a group had a 
positive NIIP of about $342 billion.   
 
If we translate the above data in absolute numbers in dollars, then the list of largest 
global debtors and creditors in 2011 is as follows: 
 
 
Table 4. Largest Global Debtors and Creditors: G20 & other Selected Countries 
US Dollar in million, based on NIIP 
2011 
 
 
Global Debtors  
 
  
Global Creditors 
 
1 USA* -2.470.989,15 
 
1 Japan 3.255.436,81 
2 Euro Area -1.543.097,33 
 
2 China 1.774.746,18 
3 Spain -1.284.088,67 
 
3 Germany**  1.335.494,48 
4 Brazil** -818.026,37 
 
4 Switzerland 937.081,93 
5 Australia* -794.884,42 
 
5 Hong Kong (P.R.C.)  702.696,41 
6 Italy -455.831,54 
 
6 Singapore* 528.836,58 
7 France -426.382,65 
 
7 Saudi Arabia* 483.568,88 
8 Mexico** -401.990,68 
 
8 Netherlands 282.975,18 
9 Turkey  -381.053,75 
 
9 Argentina* 46.201,21 
10 UK -327.646,82 
 
10 Russia* 15.684,76 
11 Indonesia* -289.265,47 
    12 India* -223.047,78 
    13 Canada -209.683,54 
    14 Korea** -126.773,18 
    15 South Africa* -70.399,83 
    *Data for 2010; **Data for 2012/Q1    
Source: IMF Statistics  
 
 
It is important, however, to note here that a positive NIIP does not necessarily imply a 
declining external debt. A country may accumulate foreign assets through current 
account surpluses, thus building a positive NIIP, but may remain a net debtor in terms 
of its debt stock
46
. Indeed, overall, in 2010 the external debt of G20 emerging 
economies rose by $340.7 billion, representing 68.8% of the combined stock of all 
emerging countries’ external debt47. Yet, this does not seem to significantly affect the 
solid global economic standing of the G20 emerging economies. 
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Table 5 demonstrates that, in 2010, the stock of the BRIC’s external debt remained 
moderate, on average at 17.5% of their gross national income (the respective figure 
for all developing countries was 21%). The same year, the BRIC’s short term debt 
was a 28% of their overall external debt (although this figure comes down to 21% if 
we exclude China). The risks and vulnerabilities, however, that are associated with 
this rather high short-term external debt were significantly mitigated by the BRIC’s 
international reserves, which on average stood at 210.6% of their overall external debt 
stock (103.8% if we exclude China’s 531.2%) (see Table 5). At the same time, in 
2010 international capital flows to developing countries increased by 68%, in 
comparison to 2009, thus returning to their pre-crisis 2007 levels. A significant part of 
this increase concerned debt related inflows (both short term related to trade, and 
public and private bond issuance), which were increased by 200% in comparison to 
2009
48
. The increase in FDI (27%) and portfolio flows (17%) was more moderate. 
These data indicate that ‘global capital markets’ look at emerging markets as a safe 
investment alternative to the embroiled European financial markets. 
 
 
Table 5: Net Debt Inflows in Selected G20 Emerging Economies 
US dollar in billions (unless otherwise indicated) 
 
 Net debt 
inflows 
2009 
Net debt 
inflows 
2010 
Short 
term to 
external 
debt stock 
(%) 
External 
debt 
stocks to 
exports 
(%) 
External 
debt 
stocks 
to GNI 
(%) 
Reserves 
to external 
debt 
stocks  
(%) 
 
China 43,5 120,9 63,4 28,9 9,3 531,2 
Russia -19,1 14,0 10,1 79,8 26,9 124,6 
Brazil 30,4 78,5 18,9 143,9 16,9 83,2 
India 18,4 38,6 19,4 80,9 16,9 103,5 
Turkey -13,8 27,7 26,6 184,0 40,4 29,3 
Mexico 8,9 29,4 19,5 62,7 19,5 60,3 
Indonesia 14,6 14,5 17,5 101,3 26,1 53,7 
Argentina -2,3 17,1 27,4 152,1 36,1 40,8 
South Africa -2,5 2,1 27,2 43,3 12,7 97 
BRIC 
(average) 
18,3 63 28 83,4 17,5 210,6 
Developing 
countries 
(average) 
- 495 25 69 21 137 
     Source: Author’s compilation of data from World Bank, 2012 
 
Our analysis up to now seems not only to uphold the argument of a new debt politics 
in the international system, but also to indicate that the emerging powers have a solid 
standing in the new global debt dynamics that increases their policy options, space for 
maneuver and ability to advocate and defend their interests in the global economy. In 
some sense, however, the terrain in which debt politics takes place remains a Western 
one. The next section focuses structural/hegemonic ‘rents’ that the West, especially 
the US, is able to extract in the current international system, and assess their impact 
on the global politics of debt.  
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Exorbitant Privileges and Hegemonic Stabilisers  
 
 
To assess the real degree of dependency and vulnerability of the largest global debtors 
to adverse external economic conditions, we need to account for the currency 
composition of their external debt liabilities. The larger percentage of debt liabilities 
denominated in foreign currencies, the larger the risks involved and the greater the 
possibilities for negative external shocks. Table 6 demonstrates that the US (and the 
major European countries) in essence borrow in their own currency. Between 80-90% 
of the US external debt is denominated in US dollars. The respective figure, on 
average, for the public debt of the largest Eurozone member states is 98.7%, and for 
the UK 100%. On the contrary, the emerging powers’ public debt is overwhelmingly 
denominated in foreign currencies. In particular, the average for the G20 emerging 
economies included in Table 6 is 97.6%, which is about the same with the BRIC 
average (97.4%), whereas the developing states average is slightly smaller at 92.5%
49
. 
Thus, not only is the external debt of the major G20 advanced economies shielded by 
exchange rates and interest rates fluctuations, but they also control the currency 
(exchange rate, interest rates, quantity) in which the overwhelming majority of all 
other states borrow
50
.  
 
Of course, this applies primarily for the US. Having a significant part of its foreign 
liabilities denominated, and therefore due and repayable, in its own currency, the US, 
in theory and in practice, can ‘export’ US inflation (i.e. print dollars) and 
‘import’/‘acquire’  products, services and foreign assets. This renders a US balance of 
payment crisis almost impossible: an exorbitant privilege indeed! But it is also more 
than that. It gives to the US the equivalent of the ‘red button’ in the nuclear balance of 
terror of the Cold War period. Access to the ‘red button’ allowed the US (and the 
USSR) to negotiate/set/control the parameters of the Cold War conflict. Respectively, 
the dollar allows the US to be at the centre and control the dynamics and the 
parameters of global debt politics. Considering, moreover, the currency composition 
of the emerging powers’ external debt, the US will continue to exercise this privilege 
in the foreseeable future.  
 
Paradoxically, the current global crisis, if anything, strengthened further the 
international role of the dollar. The currency of the largest debtor of the world 
emerged as the only ‘safe heaven’, in investment terms, in the international economic 
system. The Eurozone debt crisis and the constitutionally constrained role of the ECB 
contributed significantly to this development. Indeed whereas before the European 
debt crisis most investors used the Euro to diversify their dollar dominated portfolia, 
after the European crisis there has been a clear move away from Euro and either back 
to the dollar (in most regions) or towards the yen (especially in East Asia and the 
Pacific)
51
.  
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Table 6. Currency composition of PPG debt*  
2010 (unless otherwise indicated)  
percent of PPG debt (unless otherwise indicated) 
 
 Debt Denominated 
in Foreign 
Currency
3 
(%) 
The three more important 
currencies in which PPG debt is 
denominated( excluding SDR) 
(%) 
USA
1
 7,9 na 
Germany
2
 2,4 na 
France
2
 3,1 na 
Italy
2
 0,2 na 
Spain
2
 1 na 
UK
2
 0 na 
Russia 98,7 $: 94,5    /     €: 3,5    /     ¥: 0,4 
India 95,5 $: 71,4    /     €: 3,7    /     ¥: 19  
Brazil 97,2 $: 86,0    /     €: 6,1    /     ¥: 5,0 
China 98,2 $: 84,0    /     €: 6,9    /     ¥: 7,3 
Indonesia 95,6 $: 51,8    /     €: 8,0    /     ¥: 34,7 
Mexico 100 $: 85,8    /     €: 6,4    /     ¥: 6,1 
Turkey 99,6 $: 63,8    /     €: 31,1  /     ¥: 4,5 
S. Africa 95,8 $: 80,4    /     €: 15,4  /     ¥: 0,0 
All developing 
countries 
92,5 $: 69,4    /     €: 12,7  /     ¥: 10,4 
East Asia & Pacific 94,0 $: 62,8    /     €: 5,7    /     ¥: 25,5 
Europe & Central Asia 97,5 $: 73,1    /     €: 21,5  /     ¥: 2,9 
Latin America & 
Caribbean 
97,8 $: 84,5    /     €: 8,9    /     ¥: 4,4 
Middle East &  
North Africa 
81,8 $: 42,5    /     €: 30,5  /     ¥: 8,8 
South Asia 71,3 $: 60,4    /     €: 4,9    /     ¥: 6,0 
Sub-Saharan Africa 74,4 $: 56,8    /     €: 15,1  /     ¥: 2,3 
Source: WB, unless otherwise indicated. *The PPG debt is the external long-term public and publicly-
guaranteed debt. 
1
Gross External Debt on 30/06/2012. Source: US Treasury. The Table does not 
include a 12.1% of external debt which is declared by the US Treasury as ‘unknown’ in its composition 
and which refers to ‘direct investments’, ‘other debt liabilities’ and a portion of ‘loans to other sectors’. 
2 
General government debt at the end of 2011. Source: ECB. 
3Author’s calculation based on WB’s 
currency composition data. 
 
 
The above exorbitant privilege and hegemonic role of the US arm the country with 
further structural side-advantages in the changing global debt politics. That is, the US, 
due to its structural position in the global economy, is able to extract side (valuation) 
rents/benefits that affect positively its foreign assets/wealth and thus its net 
international investment position. Although the discussion on what causes these 
benefits and how they are materialised is still open
52
, no one disputes their existence. 
The rest of this section focuses on this issue.  
 
The Current Account (CA) measures annual changes (flows) in the NIIP (stock) of a 
country. Thus, ceteris paribus, annual changes in the national CA balance equal 
annual changes in the national NIIP. A deficit in the annual CA demonstrates a 
country that needs to borrow from abroad and the amount of this borrowing 
corresponds to the amount of deterioration in the NIIP of a country at the given 
15 
 
period. A surplus in the annual CA demonstrates a country that lends money abroad 
and corresponds to the amelioration in the country’s annual NIIP.  In practice, these 
two figures (CA & annual change in NIIP) are rarely the same, and this is due to what 
is referred to as ‘valuation changes’. That means that regardless of any newly 
acquired foreign assets or claimed liabilities (e.g. FDI, portfolio investments) that are 
reflected in the annual CA, the value of the existing assets and liabilities (the stock 
that the NIIP represents) may change. Thus, in practice annual changes in NIIP equal 
annual changes in the CA (flows) plus changes in the valuation of existing assets and 
liabilities (stocks) (e.g. due to inflation or exchange rates changes; see below). When 
this valuation effect is negative, a country may run a CA surplus in a given year, 
without this being translated into a corresponding annual improvement in its NIIP.  
This happens because its CA surpluses are counterbalanced by a decrease in the value 
of its foreign assets over the same year in which it run the CA surpluses. The opposite 
is also possible. A country may run a CA deficit without this being translated in an 
equivalent deterioration of its annual NIIP, because its foreign assets may have been 
appreciated over the same period of time. This is exactly what has been happening in 
the US after the beginnings of the 2000s, when its CA balance started to deteriorate at 
a fast pace.  
 
In particular, although the US runs CA deficits above 4% of its GDP throughout the 
period 2002-2007, reaching the record high 6.1% of GDP in 2005 and 2006, the US’s 
NIIP over the same period registered a minor increase. As Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe 
calculate, during the period 2002-2007, the US registered  
 
‘a cumulative deficit of 3.9 trillion dollars, or 32 percent of GDP. 
Nevertheless, the net international investment position increased by 
0.08 trillion dollars...a huge discrepancy of almost $4 trillion between 
the accumulated current account balances and the change in the 
NIIP…Without this lucky strike, the U.S. net foreign asset position in 
2007 would have been an external debt of about 43 percent of GDP 
instead of the actual 13 percent’53.  
 
Along similar lines, Cline has estimated that during 2002-2004, ‘seven-eighths of the 
US imbalance in current transactions with the rest of the world…was in effect 
obtained for free because of huge favorable asset valuation changes’54. For the period 
1991-2004, Cline estimates that the valuation benefits for the US NIIP in absolute 
terms reached the $1.26 trillion mark
55
. 
 
The valuation impact of the financial crisis that followed the subprime crisis is 
equally telling with regards to the nature of global debt relations. After having 
registered a significant increase in its NIIP (3% of GDP) in 2007 (while the same year 
its CA deficit was above 5% of GDP), in 2008 the US experienced a spectacular 
decrease in its NIIP of 13.7% of its GDP (combined with a CA deficits of 4.7% of 
GDP). More interesting, however, this negative shock was followed the subsequent 
year (2009) by the largest annual increase of its NIIP (above 10.6% of its GDP), at 
least since 1979, combined with a CA deficit of -2.7% of GDP
56
. The gap between 
CA (approx. -3%) and NIIP (close to -0.5%) remained significantly positive for the 
US in 2010. Thus, valuation changes in 2008-2010 far overshadowed the negative 
impact of CA deficits on the US NIIP
57
. 
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It is more than evident from the above data that the US has demonstrated a unique 
capacity to reduce the negative impact that persistent Current Accounts deficits have 
on the international position and economic sustainability of any country. As Cline 
argues ‘what the US NIIP loses from annual current account deficits, it has tended to 
gain back at least partially through valuation effects…[T]he US could be said to have 
been able to devalue away a significant part of its external debt’58. To describe this 
phenomenon researchers have used expressions such as ‘borrowing without debt’59, 
‘debt without pain’ or ‘free debt’60. Yet, most analysts agree that this position is not 
sustainable in the medium/long term.  
 
According to official US Bureau of Economic Analysis data these valuation effects 
take place through three distinctive channels
61
: Exchange rate valuation. While the 
great majority (almost entirety) of US foreign liabilities are denominated in US 
dollars, the great majority of the US foreign assets are denominated in foreign 
national currencies
62
. Therefore, any depreciation of dollar towards the currencies of 
countries where the US holds foreign assets, leads automatically to an increase in the 
value of these US foreign assets (since local currencies appreciate towards the dollar 
and the US assets are denominated in local currencies). Thus any depreciation of the 
dollar increases the value of the US foreign assets, whist it leaves relatively 
unaffected the value of its liabilities. Taking into consideration that for most of the 
period after the beginning of the 2000s the dollar has been depreciating significantly 
(above 20%) in real effective terms towards most main foreign currencies of 
relevance to the US NIIP, it is clear that this channel has allowed the US to generate 
huge capital gains able to offset significantly the negative implications of its rapidly 
deteriorating, over the same period, current account balance
63
. Furthermore, taking 
into consideration that the US can exercise, to a considerable degree, control of the 
international value of the US dollar (both through monetary, interest-rate and foreign 
economic policies), then this valuation channel is the channel which the official US 
policy apparatus can control the most. The fact that the dollar has been strengthened 
as a result of the current crisis strengthens the US advantage in this area.  
 
Asset price valuation. There are at least two aspects with regard to asset price 
valuations. The first relates to the type of assets of which the US foreign assets and 
liabilities consist. In particular, the majority of US foreign assets are in equity type 
investments, FDI and portfolio equity (high risk – high returns), while the majority of 
US liabilities are in debt obligations, mostly bonds (low risk – low returns). 
Consequently, the value and valuation of the US foreign assets depend on fluctuations 
in the international stock prices (measured in US dollars), while the value of the US 
bonds remain rather stable and the official US policy apparatus maintains interest-
rates policy as a means to influence them. Thus, in conditions of international 
economic stability (real or illusionary—see the ‘great moderation’ period), when 
international stock markets tend to be stable or move upwards, then the capital gains 
extracted from the US foreign assets (FDI and portfolio equities) outperform by far 
the US debt liabilities. And considering the strengthening of the place of emerging 
powers in the global economy this pattern of returns is likely to continue in the 
foreseeable future
64
. Of course, this valuation affect is moderated or reversed in 
periods when international stock markets are plummeting. Yet, in this latter case a 
reverse of financial flows back to the US mitigates this negative valuation impact.  
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The second issue with regard to asset price valuation concerns the dynamic of the 
relationship between US foreign equity assets (FDI & portfolio equities) and US 
foreign liabilities in respective equity-type investments (i.e. the US foreign liabilities 
that do not concern debt obligations). Here the direction of the valuation effect 
(positive or negative) depends on how the US stock market performs in relation to 
international stock markets. When the US stock market outperforms its competitors 
the value of US liabilities (US equity owned by non-US investors) increases (i.e. there 
is a negative valuation effect for the US), whereas when stock markets internationally, 
for instance in emerging powers, outperform the US stock market, as has been the 
case since the break out of the global economic crisis, then the value of US foreign 
assets is boosted (positive valuation effect for the US). Putting this in historical 
perspective, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti found that
65
: (a) during the period 1983-92 stock 
prices increased at similar rates in the US and the rest of the world. Yet, for most of 
this period US foreign equity liabilities were significantly larger than U.S. foreign 
equity assets, and therefore the valuation effect had been negative for the US. (b) 
During the period 1993-2001 the US stock market outperformed stock markets 
internationally, and this negative valuation effect for the US was multiplied by the 
appreciation of the US dollar. (c) During 2002-2006, these conditions were reversed, 
and the positive valuation effect generated by the boom in stock markets outside the 
US was multiplied by the depreciation of dollar, and the fact that the amount of both 
foreign assets and liabilities had significantly increased as a percentage of the US 
GDP. Taking into consideration, however, that fluctuations in the US stock market 
exercise a significant psychological impact on international (stock) markets and 
significantly influence international market sentiments, one would overall expect a 
rather synchronic movement of US and international stock markets, and therefore 
valuation effects coming from diverse stock market performances should not be 
exaggerated – taking also in consideration that the majority of the US foreign 
liabilities are in bonds
66. Notwithstanding, in the ‘decade of debt’ that the West is 
going through (see above) it could be assumed that portfolio equities in the emerging 
powers would be more attractive to investors in comparison to equities in western 
stock markets.  
       
Other and Residual Valuation. This channel has sparked a great debate in the 
literature
67
. Since the beginnings of the 2000s, the positive valuation impact coming 
from this channel on the US external position has been significant (at times equivalent 
to the positive effect from the exchange rate valuation).  There is no agreement 
however whether this positive valuation impact comes from unrecorded/misrecorded 
financial flows (FDI or portfolio equity), problems in the measurement of the stock of 
assets and liabilities, or not accounted for (or not easily accountable) capital gains 
from intangible US assets, often referred to also as ‘dark matter’ (e.g. export of 
business and management know-how and brand name value). 
 
Of course, valuation effects are not ‘US-specific’.  They can and do occur in all 
countries. This is most evident with regard to exchange rate valuation changes. As 
shown above, the external debt of most countries is not only denominated in different 
currencies, but it also expressed/measured in US dollar value. Thus fluctuations in the 
value of the US dollar and other external-debt-related-currencies produce 
automatically valuation changes for the countries involved. For instance, whereas in 
2011, on average, the US dollar was depreciated against the Brazilian real, the 
Japanese yen, the Chinese yuan, the South Korean won, the Mexican peso and the 
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South African rand (thus producing positive valuation changes for the US), it 
appreciated against the Indian rupee (thus producing positive valuation changes for 
India)
68
. In particular, for the period between end-March 2011 and end-December 
2011, this dollar appreciation produced a positive valuation effect on Indian external 
debt of US$12.2 billion. Thus, whereas without the valuation effect the Indian 
external debt at the end of 2011 would have been US$ 347.1 billion, the valuation 
change brought this number down to US$ 334.9 billion
69
.  
 
Yet, the multiplicity of the valuation channels described above demonstrates that the 
case of the US with regard to valuation changes is unique both quantitatively and 
qualitatively. From the above analysis, it is evident that the US due to the 
international role of dollar, the degree of the international economic integration of its 
economy, and overall its central/hegemonic place in the global economy has at its 
service a unique range of structural and institutional mechanisms that function as 
‘automatic stabilisers’ not only for the sustainability of its external position but also 
for its broader hegemonic role in the international economy. And this, without 
including the role, effect and influence of the US in the organisations and institutions 
that define the existing international economic architecture (e.g. IMF, World Bank, 
G20).          
   
To conclude, the analysis of valuation effects demonstrates the multiplicity and 
complexity of the channels through which the US has been able to ‘devalue away’ a 
significant part of its external debt over the past decade. For this reason, the 
mechanisms of valuation changes are a critical aspect of the study of the nature and 
dynamic of the current power politics of debt.   
 
 
At the final analysis, agency matters as much as structure 
 
In our preceding analysis we have tried to assess the implications of the global 
economic crisis the broke out in 2007/8, in terms of new global debt relations, 
dynamics, dependencies, politics and economics. We have also attempted to examine 
less apparent aspects of this global debt architecture that manifest the structural power 
of the US, as well as ‘structural biases’ embedded in the existing structure that favour 
the reproduction of the existing global politico-economic order and status quo.  
 
Yet, it would be a mistake to take the impact of the current crisis on the US, China, 
the EU and the other major politico-economic players as given. The impact that the 
crisis will have on the major global politico-economic actors and their relations is not 
independent from the way in which these actors have tried and will try to deal with 
the ongoing crisis. Put differently, the impact of the crisis on each actor depends 
critically on the policies and strategies that each actor itself deploys and has deployed 
in order to overcome the crisis. The case of the Eurozone is a pointed example. The 
handling of the Greek issue in 2009 mutated into a national debt crisis for Greece, 
which itself mutated into a debt crisis for the Eurozone’s periphery, spread in Italy 
and Spain, and threatens to bring about the collapse of Euro/Eurozone. Thus, to a 
large extent Europe from ‘an-example-to-follow’ has now started to be seen 
internationally as ‘an-example-to-avoid’. Furthermore, internally, the sense of trust 
amongst European elites and peoples that have gradually been built after WWII now 
seems to have reverted back to old nationalistic sentiments and stereotypes. Thus, a 
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crisis that originated in the US and could have been used as an opportunity to 
strengthen the international role of the EU and its common currency, led to exactly 
the opposite direction. It has proved damaging both for its international image and 
role, and for its internal cohesion and integration dynamics. And this, primarily due to 
the way in which the EU/Eurozone itself responded to the crisis.  
 
The response to the crisis is also critical because it determines how long it will take 
for each actor to exit the crisis and at what cost. Here, one should be very cautious 
with forecasts and generalisations. Yet, the evidence presented hitherto seems to 
support overwhelmingly the thesis of a decade of debt and debt adjustment for the 
West, specifically the US and the EU. A lesson drawn from past debt crises in 
advanced economies is that the mode of deleveraging is key for a return to a 
sustainable economic path. For instance, not dealing in time and effectively with bad, 
non-performing loans clogs the financial system and undermines its stability and 
credibility. The longer the problem remains unresolved, the longer it takes for a return 
to a sustainable growth path. For instance, in Japan, the failure, for almost a decade 
after the burst of the real estate and stock market bubbles in 1989, to deal effectively 
with its overleveraged corporate sector, has been an important factor behind the 
country’s inability to overcome its economic crisis for the past two decades70. Of 
course, international currency politics and the appreciation of yen after the Plaza 
Accord, is also critical for understanding the ‘Japanese malaise’.  
 
In the current debt crisis and in terms of deleveraging the US seems to have taken a 
much more resolute stance in comparison to the EU. As Roxburgh et al demonstrate
71
, 
since the end of 2008, ‘all categories of US private-sector debt have fallen as a 
percent of GDP’. The larger reduction was registered in the financial sector, where by 
mid-2011 the ratio had fallen below where it stood in 2000 - a reduction that in 
absolute terms is estimated at $1.9 trillion.  ‘Nearly $1 trillion of this decline can be 
attributed to the collapse of Lehman Brothers, JP Morgan Chase’s purchase of Bear 
Stearns, and the Bank of America-Merrill Lynch merger. Since 2008, banks also have 
been funding themselves with more deposits and less debt’72. The respective reduction 
in US household debt in absolute terms was 4 percent, approx. $0.6 trillion, one third 
of which concerned defaults on home loans and consumer debt. Thus, in 2011 the ‘US 
households have reduced their debt relative to disposable income by 15 percentage 
points, more than in any other country; at this rate, they could reach sustainable debt 
levels in two years or so’73. Of course the problem of non-performing assets is far 
from over in the US and the other side of this deleveraging process has been a rapid 
increase in public debt.  
 
On the other hand, while the EU/Eurozone has also experienced a rapid increase in its 
public debt, a deleveraging equivalent to that seen in the US is still pending. Based on 
past debt crises , this probably indicates that the Eurozone has been left behind in 
terms of returning to a sustainable economic path, and thus its debt crisis may take 
more time and resources to overcome. And this, despite the fact that the EU, at the 
time of the break out of the crisis had, and still has, better economic fundamentals in 
comparison to the US. A prolonged crisis in the European economy, however, cannot 
but have a negative impact on the US economy and its adjustment process. In such a 
scenario, in which a prolonged European ‘economic malaise’ drags down the US and 
its economic recovery process, the result would be an acceleration of the geopolitical 
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and geoeconomic implications that are nested in the new global debt relations 
described above. Yet, on this only time will tell. 
 
Conclusions 
 
It is a mistake to treat the ‘West’ and the ‘global South’ as single entities. Major 
actors in both these blocks have different economic fundamentals and interests, are 
integrated differently in the global economy, differentiated in their strength in global 
economic negotiations, and have been affected differently by and have adopted 
different strategies in response to the crisis. Yet, our analysis has shown that there are 
significant differences in the debt and external positions between the G20 advanced 
and emerging economies, that these differences produce historically unprecedented 
global debt relations in favour of emerging economies, and that there is no easy or fast 
(peaceful) way for the advanced economies to overcome the negative implications of 
the current crisis and reverse the existing current account flows and dependencies
74
. 
In this sense, post 2007/08 global debt relations breed the potential of geopolitical and 
geoeconomic transformation. Our analysis, however, has demonstrated also that the 
West and especially the US plays in its own court and maintains sufficient structural 
power to control the parameters of any significant change in the global political 
economy. Controlling these parameters, however, is not the same as deciding the 
content and agenda of global political economy. Our findings suggest that the need to 
deleverage and rebase the Western economic system on stable foundation, so as to 
restore its sustainability, will not only take time but, most importantly, it is a game 
that the West has to play from a position of weakness (excessive leverage and/or 
indebtedness, eurozone crisis), at least in comparison to its traditional post-WWII 
status.  
 
In this environment, the emerging powers can and have strengthened their presence 
and voice within the Bretton Woods system (e.g. enhanced role of G20, redistribution 
of voting rights in the IMF). In this way, the system becomes more representative and 
a decoupling of the ‘global South’ less likely. After all, this system has served as the 
ladder used by the BRIC themselves, especially China, to emerge. But no significant 
geopolitical changes seem to be in order. In this way, the most significant change 
brought about by the new global debt politics and economics concerns the very 
resolution of the debt crisis itself. In past episodes, hegemons would resolve ‘global 
imbalances’ (see hegemonic imbalances) by imposing their will and self-beneficial 
solution on all other stakeholders (by political pressure, sanctions, gunboats or 
otherwise). Currently, the US seems no longer to be in a position to impose its terms, 
about the needed global re-adjustment, on the rest of the world. In this sense, the 
emerging powers seem to have gained a new space of policy autonomy. To what this 
space will be translated depends on both structure and agency. 
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